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THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AND THE COMMAND-
AND-CONTROL MODEL OF REGULATION 
ERIC R. CLAEYS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the overarching themes of this conference by 
studying major legal developments in the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) from roughly 1960 forward.  There are several good reasons to conduct 
an in-depth study of the FDA.  First, the FDA provides a concise way to 
compare developments in regulatory health law in relation to developments in 
federal administrative law generally.  The FDA has been in existence almost as 
long as there has been federal “administrative law,” and its organization and 
mandate have changed along with elite opinions about the proper objects of 
federal regulation.  Congress established the Food and Drug Administration by 
statute in 1906,1 changed its mission dramatically in 1938,2 and has tinkered 
with its mandate in important ways since.  Thus, while most of the other 
articles in this symposium cover statutes and regulatory structures created after 
1960, the FDA’s experience exemplifies how administrative law trends after 
1960 affected an agency that already had a mission shaped by regulatory ideas 
from the Progressive Era and the New Deal. 
Second, there are also advantages to studying the theme of this symposium 
by studying a single agency in depth.  Professor Jost’s keynote article will 
surely be more comprehensive than this Article, but when one goes for as 
much breadth as Jost does, one loses something in depth.  In particular, the 
student of administrative law must pay attention not only when Congress 
changes the language of enabling statutes; he or she must also pay attention 
when courts change general doctrines of statutory interpretation and 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. 
 1. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 
301–397 (2000)); PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 4 (2d 
ed. 1991); see also Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of Government Regulation 
of Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 2, 52–53 (1984); Wallace 
F. Janssen, America’s First Food and Drug Laws, 30 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 665, 665 (1975). 
 2. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified at 21 
U.S.C. §§ 301–397); see HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 10–13; see also CHARLES O. 
JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE NEW DEAL (1970). 
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administrative law judicial review.  Most of all, the administrative lawyer must 
follow when the agency changes its policies and practices.  The FDA illustrates 
several of these non-statutory developments. 
In the period from 1960 to 1980, the FDA’s mission and structure did not 
change at the wholesale level, but they did change at the retail level.  Before 
1960, the FDA acted primarily as an executive enforcement agency in its food 
docket, it acted as a watered- down licensing agency in its drug docket, and it 
had very limited powers to promulgate legislative rules.  As of 1980, the FDA 
was still primarily an enforcement agency in relation to foods.  It was still a 
licensing agency in relation to drugs, but Congress had strengthened its 
licensing powers and raised the standards for granting new drug applications.  
Congress invested the FDA with new licensing and rulemaking powers over 
medical devices.  By 1980, the FDA had also asserted for itself the power to 
issue legislative rules over topics far wider than what was understood during 
the 1960s.  Thus, the FDA retained the same overall structure and mission, but 
where Congress granted or the FDA asserted new powers, those powers tended 
to mirror theories of government and administrative law that prevailed among 
leading lawyers and academics in the period from 1960 to 1980. 
These developments could support a few different conclusions, but I draw 
three here.  First, to the extent that the FDA “grew” or developed toward the 
Great Society command-and-control model, one of the reasons was the 
administrative law version of peer pressure.  From 1960 forward, 
administrative law specialists were increasingly dissatisfied with pre-existing 
models of regulation, and the Great Society command-and-control model was 
generally accepted as the common cure for the most common problems.  
Second, the FDA’s structure tends to refute the idea that health agencies take 
on the structure they have to encourage the application of expertise.  The FDA 
uses its experts in food, drug, and device safety in very different ways, and 
general ideas about expertise cannot explain these variations in FDA practice.  
Finally, the FDA’s success in drug regulation helps explain at least in part why 
other health-related agencies needed, and still may need, to move toward the 
Great Society command-and-control model.  The FDA’s success in drug 
approval highlights the conditions in which a New Deal adjudicative or 
licensing-style approach can work.  Many other federal health-related agencies 
do not meet the conditions that allow the FDA to succeed. 
Before I begin, let me say one word about my method and the conclusions 
I will draw.  This Article will concentrate heavily on the statutory law and key 
case law shaping the FDA’s mission and structure.  These sources are not far-
ranging enough to provide a comprehensive description of the FDA’s mission 
and institutional structure.  To provide such a comprehensive description, one 
would need to describe what Richard Merrill has called the FDA’s 
“architecture,” and cover the FDA’s internal organization, the important 
legislative and regulatory battles that have shaped the FDA’s collective 
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experience, the institutional culture of different divisions, and other similar 
factors.3  Nevertheless, the key statutes and cases should suffice to demonstrate 
the points I hope to prove. 
Part II explains what makes the “Great Society,” “rights revolution,” or 
“command-and-control” model for regulation, used by many federal agencies, 
distinctive from other preceding regulatory models.  Part III recounts how the 
FDA “grew” incompletely toward this model in the period from 1960 to 1980.  
Part IV interprets the lessons from the FDA’s structure and changes to answer 
this conference’s overarching questions about the relationship between health 
regulation and the Great Society command-and-control model. 
II.  THE EMERGENCE OF THE 1960S-1970S MODEL FOR COMMAND-AND-
CONTROL REGULATION 
In federal administrative law, the law depends heavily on history.  
Different agencies are structured differently and assume different substantive 
responsibilities depending on when they were enacted.  That is because 
elites—the law professors; top-rank regulatory lawyers in private practice; and 
the leading public servants in Congress, the Department of Justice, and the 
agencies—have changed opinions about how best to run agencies.  Of course, 
even when agencies are created in the same era, their enabling acts can differ 
due to differences in the topics they regulate, in the politics around those 
topics, or in the interest-group coalitions that pressure the public players in the 
field.  Still, all administrative lawyers would agree that the structures of federal 
agencies are influenced to a significant degree by theories of law and 
government that prevailed when the agencies were created. 
Cass Sunstein provides a representative and informative way of thinking 
about these shifts in elite opinion when he posits that there have been five 
“eras” or “waves” of thought about federal regulation since the nineteenth 
century.4  First, during what is (loosely) called the Progressive Era, Congress 
 
 3. Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 
VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996).  Even then, a social scientist might expect a comprehensive account to 
be more systematic and precise in assessing how different forces have shaped the FDA’s policy 
making, as one can see by reading Theodore R. Marmor’s critique of Merrill in Commentary, Or 
the Notes and Asides of an FDA Amateur and Professional Political Scientist Specializing in 
Battles Over the Modern Welfare State, 82 VA. L. REV. 1867 (1996). 
 4. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 18–31 (1990).  For confirmation that Sunstein’s approach is representative, 
it is worth noting that Gary Lawson presents a similar view in the opening chapter of his 
casebook FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 26–28 (3d ed. 2004).  Lawson differs sharply from 
Sunstein in their opinions about the proper objects of federal regulation, on the proper objects of 
administrative law scholarship, and on what counts as “law” and “doctrine” worth teaching.  Id.  
Even so, Lawson in this section presents the opinions of a Progressive, a New Dealer, and several 
post-1960s commentators to give a sample of the way in which contemporary legal opinions 
affect opinions about regulation.  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
108 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:105 
started creating what looked like modern administrative agencies, such as the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.5  
Congress and courts developed statutory, due process, and interstitial judge-
made doctrines to make sure that these new agencies guaranteed trial-type 
procedures and provided for judicial review.6  The New Deal then effected a 
wholesale change both of the objects of and the institutions of government.  
The New Deal was organized not around private freedoms of property and 
contract but around public rights of the sort that President Roosevelt listed in 
his second Bill of Rights—”[t]he right to a useful and remunerative job . . . 
[t]he right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of 
freedom from unfair competition” and so forth.7  As Cass Sunstein recognizes, 
“[p]rotection of rights of this sort of course extended the reach of the 
government in altogether different directions from those marked out by the 
original property and contract interests.”8  Of course, government could not 
secure these “affirmative” public rights without a massive structural 
transformation—in Sunstein’s description, “a transfer of power from the states 
to the federal government, a massive growth in the national bureaucracy, a 
weakening of the judiciary and of legal controls on politics and 
administration.”9 
After an intermediate third period, in which the growth of administration 
subsided and Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act,10 
administration grew dramatically again in the period of the Great Society and 
the Nixon presidency.  Cass Sunstein calls this period the “rights revolution.”11  
The rights revolution built on the basic institutional and substantive 
commitments of the New Deal, but with important modifications.12  First, 
substantively, national elites extended the logic of the “affirmative rights” 
touted during the New Deal to new categories of rights.13  The New Deal had 
applied affirmative rights logic to economic interests, such as the worker’s 
 
 5. SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 19. 
 6. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 19–
35 (5th ed. 2002). 
 7. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 
1944), reprinted in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, at 32, 
41 (1969).  Sunstein has written on the symbolic importance of Roosevelt’s Second Bill of 
Rights.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004). 
 8. SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 22. 
 9. Id. at 23. 
 10. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2000)).  For discussion of the phase Breyer calls “the Maturation 
of the Traditional Model of Administrative Law,” see BREYER ET AL., supra note 6, at 24–26. 
 11. SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 24. 
 12. Id. at 24–29. 
 13. Id. at 24. 
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right to a job, a fair wage, and collective bargaining, and the business’s right to 
a level playing field in competition.14  By the 1960s, as Sunstein recounts, 
“Congress and the President [were] invok[ing] the rhetorical power of the civil 
rights movement on behalf of causes involving not only discrimination on 
various grounds, but also the environment, workers, the poor, and even 
consumers.”15  Congress passed laws setting out to accomplish “bold 
regulatory initiatives in a number of new areas, most prominently involving air 
and water pollution, discrimination, and management of social risks in 
general.”16  This demand for new rights encouraged the creation of many of the 
health-related agencies and initiatives that Professor Jost recounts in his 
keynote address. 
Separately, Congress also tinkered with the New Deal blueprint for 
administrative government during the “rights revolution” period.  While the 
rights revolution marked “an outburst of enthusiasm for regulatory solutions to 
public problems,” Sunstein recognizes, this outburst occurred as “[t]he work of 
administrative agencies came under increasingly sharp attack on several 
fronts.”17  One common theme was “capture,” the concern that agencies were 
becoming what Gary Lawson calls “pawns of the regulated industries.”18  
Another was that agencies proceeded unfairly because they decided similar 
adjudications differently.19 
Third, and most important, New Deal agencies, which relied heavily on 
adjudications to make new law, were not making new law quickly enough to 
secure the many affirmative rights Congress expected them to secure.  To 
appreciate elite frustration, consider the case of James Landis.  Landis’s 1938 
book The Administrative Process20 is still regarded as an excellent and 
representative justification of the New Deal independent commission.  In 1960, 
however, in response to a request by President-elect Kennedy, Landis wrote a 
report despairing of the effectiveness of administrative agencies.  “A prime 
criticism of the regulatory agencies is their failure to develop broad policies in 
the areas subject to their jurisdiction.”21  Landis attributed this problem to an 
“inability to fashion viable patterns through the process of adjudication.”22  He 
 
 14. Id. at 21–22. 
 15. Id. at 24–25. 
 16. SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 25–26. 
 17. BREYER ET AL., supra note 6, at 26. 
 18. LAWSON, supra note 4, at 10; see, e.g., ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 40–
43 (1971); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1039, 1050–52 (1997). 
 19. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 66 (1971). 
 20. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). 
 21. STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE TO THE SENATE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE 
PRESIDENT-ELECT 22 (Comm. Print 1960) (written by James M. Landis). 
 22. Id. 
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called for “other methods of policy planning,”23 especially rulemaking, 
because “[p]olicy also emanates from rule-making where forward-planning is 
more possible.”24 
As a result, Great Society-vintage agencies and enabling statutes followed 
a slightly different model from New Deal-vintage agencies and statutes.  
Unlike the New Deal model, the Great Society model extended collective 
securities to a wider range of conduct.  In addition, “rights revolution” 
enabling statutes tried to conquer social problems on a wide range of fronts.  
The statutes were often ambitious in scope.  The statutory preambles declared 
problems like clean air, clean water, workplace safety, and traffic safety to be 
national menaces; the operative language gave the agencies broad enforcement 
powers to reduce or eliminate these problems.25  Separately, to avoid many of 
the capture problems associated with the New Deal model, it abandoned the 
multi-member independent commission and embraced the single-headed 
executive agency model. 
Finally, because Landis and other elites were so frustrated with “one case 
at a time” administrative adjudication, Great Society-vintage agencies acquired 
much more sweeping rulemaking powers.  The NLRB, created in the New 
Deal, makes a great deal of law in unfair-labor-practice adjudications; the 
FCC, created in the 1920s, had a long tradition of making law through 
licensing proceedings.  Agencies created after 1960, by contrast, were expected 
to make law by promulgating binding performance standards and other 
binding, general, and forward-looking rules of conduct. 
The Food and Drug Administration makes an extremely interesting case 
study because it is a hybrid of these different periods.  Different divisions of 
the FDA reflect different eras of thought about federal administration.  
Structurally, the FDA looks more like a Great Society-vintage single-headed 
agency than a New Deal multi-member independent commission.  In reality, 
however, it follows the single-headed model because it was organized in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, during the Progressive Era, when 
the independent commission model was of doubtful constitutionality.26 
More important, in terms of its functions, the FDA was, as of 1955, in part 
a Progressive Era enforcement agency and in part a New Deal licensing 
agency.  In its food and cosmetic dockets, the FDA acted then, and to a large 
extent still acts now, as a specialized enforcement agency—as a specialized 
adjunct to federal prosecutors in the Department of Justice.  While the FDA 
issues guidelines and tries to set enforcement policies relating to foods and 
cosmetics, it does not oversee the marketing of foods and cosmetics in any 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 18. 
 25. SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 29. 
 26. See LAWSON, supra note 4, at 9. 
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centralized way.  Instead, it identifies food and cosmetics on the market that 
might be adulterated or misbranded and then cooperates with U.S. Attorneys 
and Justice Department officials to control these articles with traditional law-
enforcement techniques.  In its drug docket, by contrast, the FDA acted more 
like a New Deal licensing agency.  Drug companies were required to notify the 
FDA before they brought new drugs to market, and the FDA had the 
opportunity to review these drugs for their safety.  While the FDA 
concentrated on prosecution and the review of drug safety, it was given 
exceedingly narrow powers to promulgate “substantive” or “legislative 
rules”—food, drug, and other standards as binding and enforceable as 
provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  Each of these features of the 
FDA’s structure and powers, however, changed significantly starting in the late 
1950s. 
III.  DEVELOPMENTS IN FOOD AND DRUG LAW 
The FDA changed along with the times during the 1960s and 1970s.  The 
FDA, one should note, did not undergo any wholesale overhaul in its mission 
or structure.  Agencies tend to retain their basic structure and mission once 
created.  Absent unusual circumstances, factors including inertia, reliance 
interests, and interest-group politics deter Congress from drastically 
restructuring the agencies it supervises.  Congress occasionally reorganizes 
agencies in response to crises such as 9/11, but 9/11 shows how exceptional 
circumstances must be to break from the general rules.  Even so, when 
Congress updated the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, some of the changes 
carried the spirit of the Great Society with them.  More interesting, the FDA’s 
mandate changed as legal elites outside Congress—FDA lawyers and the 
courts—cited general administrative law principles that were au courant at the 
time to read the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act very differently from how it 
had been read during the New Deal. 
A. The Additive Amendments and the Delaney Clause 
Congress gave a hint at what would become the “rights revolution” when it 
enacted several major amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in the 
early 1960s.  Generally, the FDA regulates the sale of food more leniently than 
many other articles in its jurisdiction.  Again, “food” regulation follows the 
pre-New Deal, “enforcement” blueprint.  Unlike devices and drugs, the FDA 
does not require pre-approval to sell foods.  In addition, unlike drugs and 
medical devices, food is presumed safe until the FDA specifically proves it to 
be dangerous, not the other way around.  To prove food is adulterated, the 
FDA must prove either that it contains an added poisonous or deleterious 
substance that creates a possibility that the food may be injurious to health or 
that it contains an unadded substance that ordinarily renders it injurious to 
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health.27  As interpreted, the FDA presumes food is safe but goes after added 
substances if they create any possibility of threat to the health of any 
consumer.28 
In 1958 and 1960, Congress tightened the safety standards for food 
additives and color additives, respectively.  The concerns expressed in 
congressional debates reflected the kinds of health and consumer concerns that 
would become popular arguments in the 1960s.  In the legislative record for 
the Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Senators complained that the FDA 
needed two or more years of proof to document a threat to health.29  As one 
Senate report complained, “[y]et, until that proof is forthcoming, an 
unscrupulous processor of foodstuffs is perfectly free to purvey to millions of 
our people foodstuffs containing additives which may or may not be capable of 
producing illness, debility, or death.”30 
The 1958 Amendments provided a solution.  For additives not already in 
common use or generally recognized by experts as safe,31 the law switched 
from a presumption that the product is safe to a presumption it is not, and put 
the burden on the manufacturer to prove otherwise.32  The same Senate report 
explained: “[T]he processor who wants to add a new and unproven additive 
[should be required] to accept the responsibility now voluntarily borne by all 
responsible food processors of first proving it to be safe for ingestion by 
human beings.”33  Congress followed a similar approach with respect to color 
additives in the Color Additive Amendments of 1960.34 
These additive amendments created even less tolerance for additives 
containing cancer-causing substances.  The Food and Cosmetics Additive 
Amendments also contained language popularly known as the “Delaney 
Clause.” These clauses instruct the FDA “[t]hat no additive shall be deemed to 
be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it 
is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of 
food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal.”35  This language comes 
from section 409 of the Act, relating to food additives, but the Act contains 
similar language for color additives, courtesy of the Color Additive 
 
 27. See 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (2000); United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 
U.S. 399, 406 (1914). 
 28. See Lexington, 232 U.S. at 411. 
 29. S. REP. NO. 85-2422, at 1 (1958). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, § 2, 72 Stat. 1784, 1784 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2000)). 
 32. 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(a), (b)(1), (c)(3)(A) (2000)).  This statute also allows the FDA to set 
tolerance limits for additives on specified conditions.  21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(4) (2000). 
 33. S. REP. NO. 85-2422, at 2. 
 34. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618, § 706(a), 74 Stat. 397, 399 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379e(a) (2000)). 
 35. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A). 
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Amendments of 1960.36  Among scholars and lawyers who work with risk 
management, the Delaney Clauses serve as a metaphor for overzealous 
regulation.37 
Even with these changes, food regulation is more interesting conceptually 
than practically.  The regulation of food illustrates nicely the relatively laissez-
faire approach to public regulation in the early twentieth century.  The 
regulation of additives, especially cancer-causing additives, foreshadows and 
illustrates the penchant for “zero tolerance” typical of some Great Society-
vintage statutes.  Yet even with the additive amendments, the FDA’s basic 
approach to food regulation remained in the “enforcement” model. 
B. Drugs: Pre-approval and Clinical Trials 
By contrast, in 1962 Congress also passed far-reaching amendments to the 
FDA’s drug provisions.  These amendments completed the FDA’s move 
toward a “licensing” model for drug regulation.  The 1938 Act required 
manufacturers to notify the FDA of their intentions to market “new drugs” and 
to allow FDA staff time to assess the safety of those drugs,38 but it did not bar 
manufacturers from marketing and selling drugs without FDA pre-market 
approval.39  In response to a tragedy involving the drug thalidomide,40 
Congress also amended the Act in 1962 in several respects.  First, and most 
important, Congress converted, in Richard Merrill’s words, “what had been a 
pre-market notification system . . . into a pre-market approval system.”41  The 
 
 36. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618 § 706(b)(5)(B), 74 Stat. 397, 
400 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379e(b)(5)(B) (2000)). 
A color additive (i) shall be deemed unsafe, and shall not be listed, for any use which will 
or may result in ingestion of all or part of such additive, if the additive is found by the 
Secretary to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found by the 
Secretary, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of additives for 
use in food, to induce cancer in man or animal . . . . 
Id. 
 37. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 179 (2000) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing the Delaney amendments to illustrate why “experience counsels 
against an overly rigid interpretation of the FDCA that is divorced from the statute’s overall 
health-protecting purposes”); Margaret Gilhooley, Plain Meaning, Absurd Results and the 
Legislative Purpose: The Interpretation of the Delaney Clause, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 267 (1988). 
 38. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052–53 (1938) (codified 
at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000)). 
 39. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 1762–64 (discussing problems with the 1938 enforcement 
scheme). 
 40. See THE INSIGHT TEAM OF THE SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON, SUFFER THE CHILDREN: 
THE STORY OF THALIDOMIDE (1979). 
 41. Merrill, supra note 3, at 1764–65 (emphasis added). 
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amendments changed the law to deem adulterated any new drug for which the 
FDA had not yet approved a new drug application.42 
Second, Congress changed the substantive standards for determining 
whether a new drug is adulterated.  It added a new criterion beyond safety—
effectiveness for the drug’s intended use under prescribed conditions.43  
Congress also substantially increased the standard of proof to show a drug is 
not adulterated.  The amendments required the company to prove both safety 
and effectiveness by “substantial evidence,” which section 505(d) of the Act 
defines to mean “evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled 
investigations”—which means more than one investigation—”including 
clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and 
experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved.”44 
No doubt, these amendments were passed in part in response to a public 
backlash against the thalidomide scare.  At the same time, they also reflect in 
part the “no tolerance” mentality that would become characteristic of later 
Great Society regulatory programs.  As Richard Merrill explains, “Citizens 
may complain when local police fail to curtail unlawful or violent activity, but 
few believe that even the best-functioning police force can solve, much less 
prevent all crimes.”45  Courtesy of the 1962 amendments, however, the “FDA 
is believed to have a different role, a responsibility to prevent harm before it 
occurs. . . . [I]n some sense, the agency becomes a warrantor of manufacturer 
compliance with the rules that govern drug development and marketing.”46 
C. The Medical Device Amendments 
With respect to medical devices, however, Congress took a different route.  
The 1976 Medical Device Amendments show how general theories of 
government can run into serious limits when applied to particulars.  In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, federal appeals courts issued decisions upholding FDA 
attempts to regulate as FDA “drugs” articles that were “devices” by ordinary, 
common-sense understandings of the difference between “devices” and 
“drugs.”47  These developments prompted Congress and device manufacturers 
 
 42. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §104(a), 76 Stat. 780, 784 (codified at 
21 U.S.C. § 355(a)). 
 43. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(5). 
 44. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
 45. Merrill, supra note 3, at 1768. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . . , 394 U.S. 784 
(1969) (holding an antibiotic sensitivity disk to be a “drug”); AMP Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825 
(2d Cir. 1968) (holding a ligature product to be a “drug”). 
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to consider amending the FDCA to provide medical devices with a regulatory 
track different from the pre-approval track for drugs.48 
If “rights-revolution” ideas were the only factor influencing the FDA and 
Congress, Congress could have chosen to do very little—to sit back and 
encourage the FDA to classify more device-seeming articles as “drugs.”  
Legally, since the FDA may classify as a drug any “articles (other than food) 
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body” or any article 
intended to have a therapeutic effect, the statutory definitions for drugs gave 
the FDA great authority to classify medical devices as FDA drugs.49  
Politically, medical devices create the same sorts of incentives regulators face 
with drugs—to err on the side of caution.  FDA regulators typically get little 
blame for stifling innovation when they take a long time to pre-approve a 
medical device; they get a great deal of blame when a device or drug causes 
harm to a substantial group of consumers.  To illustrate, in the early 1970s, the 
Dalkon Shield generated unwanted pregnancies, infections, and deaths.50  In 
the late 1970s and 1980s, the FDA was criticized heavily for failing to do more 
to regulate silicone breast implants.51  These criticisms were similar to the 
criticisms it experienced in the early 1960s after the thalidomide scare.52  Thus, 
elite opinions about administration and popular political opinion about health 
risks gave Congress strong incentives to continue to allow the FDA to extend 
the post-1962 new-drug model to devices. 
Yet this was not the approach Congress and the FDA chose to take.53  In 
1969, the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation 
sponsored and the National Institutes of Health funded a short conference 
about the proper scope of medical-device regulation.  The conferees 
recommended that devices be regulated differently from drugs for five reasons: 
(1) Medical devices are subject to frequent innovations; (2) relatively speaking, 
professionals tend to use devices on patients, while patients tend to use drugs 
on themselves; (3) relatively speaking, physicians develop devices, while 
pharmaceutical companies develop drugs; (4) device-making companies are 
usually less fully capitalized than drug companies; and (5) devices usually 
 
 48. See Peter Barton Hutt et al., The Standard of Evidence Required for Pre-market 
Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 605, 612 
(1992). 
 49. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2000). 
 50. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996). 
 51. Merrill, supra note 3, at 1814. 
 52. See FDA Seeks Panel’s Advice on Silicone Breast Implants, FDA Talk Paper No. T88-
81 (Nov. 3, 1988); see also Merrill, supra note 3, at 1814. 
 53. The following discussion relies on the comprehensive discussion of the legislative 
history of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 written by Peter Barton Hutt, Jr., Richard A. 
Merrill, and Alan N. Kirschenbaum, supra note 48, at 610–26. 
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generate less revenue than drugs.54  Later, 1973 and 1975 congressional 
hearings developed these differences.  As Peter Hutt, Richard Merrill, and 
Alan Kirschenbaum recount, at these hearings, “[i]ndustry representatives 
agreed that, because devices, unlike drugs, are not metabolized, their results 
are observed more readily and predicted without the necessity of elaborate 
clinical trials.  FDA representatives acknowledged that extensive clinical 
testing was unnecessary for many [device] products.”55  Meanwhile, doctors 
testified that it was difficult or impossible to test devices by the same 
controlled, double-blind tests as drugs because devices operate on and outside 
the body.  They also testified that the development protocols for devices built 
in more testing, consistent with medical norms, than corresponding protocols 
for new drugs.56 
When Congress passed the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, it 
considered these differences between drugs and devices—in the economics of 
the firms and markets, in the ability to test the product, and, above all, in the 
need for extensive pre-market testing and licensure for the product.  First, the 
1976 Amendments grandfather devices on the market before 1976 unless and 
until the FDA initiates regulatory action to re-classify them.57  Second, a 
device maker need not seek pre-market approval for any device substantially 
equivalent to a pre-1976 grandfathered device58—the manufacturer need only 
provide the FDA ninety days advance notice of its intent to market and of the 
substantial-equivalence claim.59  These two exceptions exempt many devices 
from FDA pre-approval.  One 1990 U.S. House of Representatives study 
claimed that more than 80% of the devices marketed since 1976 have been 
treated as substantially equivalent to grandfathered devices; a Senate study 
claimed the number was 95%.60  By contrast, given how the FDA and the 
 
 54. See Report of the National Conference on Medical Devices, 3 JAAMI 647 (1969). 
 55. Hutt et al., supra note 48, at 618 (footnote omitted); see also Medical Devices: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Health and Env’t of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 93d Cong. (1973); Medical Device Amendments, 1973: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong. (1973); 
Medical Device Amendments of 1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env’t of 
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. (1975). 
 56. See Hutt et al., supra note 48, at 619. 
 57. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
 58. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(f)(1), 360e(b)(1)(B).  For the statutory definition of “substantially 
equivalent,” see 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A). 
 59. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (requiring device makers to notify the FDA ninety days before 
introducing a device into interstate commerce); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
478 (1996). 
 60. See S. REP. NO. 101-513, at 15 (1990); see also Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 479–80; LARS 
NOAH & BARBARA A. NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, & MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 246 (2002); Benjamin 
A. Goldberger, The Evolution of Substantial Equivalence in FDA’s Pre-market Review of 
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Supreme Court construe the “drug” provisions of the Act, it is legally 
impossible for a drug manufacturer to bring a drug to market without obtaining 
pre-market approval under section 505 of the Act.61 
Separately, even when device makers may not use the pre-market 
notification route, the pre-market-approval process is more lenient for device 
makers than the new drug approval process.  Even for the most rigorously 
scrutinized category of devices, Class III devices, the manufacturer need not 
show safety and effectiveness with proof from multiple well-controlled clinical 
trials; it need only show a “reasonable assurance” of safety and effectiveness 
under the prescribed conditions.62  Thus, Congress and the FDA both broke 
from the general blueprint for rights-revolution regulation to design a system 
of regulation more likely to reflect the economic, physical, safety, and use 
differences between drugs and devices. 
D. Entrepreneurship at the Agency: The FDA’s Rulemaking Powers 
But Congress was not the only entity active in changing the FDA’s 
mandate.  FDA officials also took a proactive part in reshaping their own 
powers to conform to the “rights-revolution” model for agencies.  In particular, 
through a pattern of enforcement and test-case litigation, enterprising FDA 
lawyers managed to convince prominent federal courts to recognize in the 
FDA rulemaking powers considerably broader than those originally 
envisioned.  Because Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts have 
recounted this story in detail, I will simply summarize the relevant points of 
their discussion and add a few details extraneous to their argument but relevant 
to mine.63 
The 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act vested in the FDA two 
new classes of regulatory powers.  The 1906 Act had given the FDA power to 
promulgate advisory regulations, but not legislative rules with the force of law, 
to provide definitions and standards of identity for foods.64  The 1938 Act 
increased the FDA’s rulemaking powers by vesting in the FDA power to issue 
 
Medical Devices, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 317 (2001); David A. Kessler et al., The Federal 
Regulation of Medical Devices, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 357, 359 (1987). 
 61. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 629–30 (1973) 
(approving FDA regulations construing the phrase “generally recognized as safe and effective” 
within the definition of a “new drug” under 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) to require the same proof of safety 
and effectiveness as a new drug application under 21 U.S.C. § 355); United States v. 50 Boxes 
More or Less etc., 909 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 62. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360e(d)(2)(A), (B). 
 63. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The 
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002). 
 64. See Wesley E. Forte, The GMP Regulations and the Proper Scope of FDA Rulemaking 
Authority, 56 GEO. L.J. 688, 692 (1968); C. W. Crawford, Ten Years of Food Standardization, 3 
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.Q. 243, 244–45 (1948). 
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legislative rules with the force of law for definitions and identity standards for 
food, dietary-use claims on food labeling, regulations setting precautionary 
standards deteriorative drugs, and three other specific topics relating to the 
identity, adulteration, or misbranding of food and drugs.65  At the same time, 
by contemporary standards, this rulemaking grant was quite narrow and 
restricted.  Because section 701(e) of the 1938 Act required the FDA to 
provide a “hearing” and base its decision “only on substantial evidence of 
record,” the FDA was required to follow in these new legislative rulemakings 
the cumbersome procedural requirement that later came to be known as 
“formal” rulemaking requirements.66  More important, because it expressly 
vested legislative-rulemaking power in the FDA only for the six topics 
expressly enumerated in section 701(e), the 1938 Act tacitly withheld the 
power to make legislative rules on virtually every other substance in the FDA’s 
jurisdiction. 
Section 701(a) of the 1938 Act, however, gave the FDA “authority to 
promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of this Act.”67  Based on 
the conventions of the time, section 701(a) only authorized the FDA to 
promulgate interpretive regulations, not legislative regulations with the force 
of law.  As Merrill and Watts explain after a close review of the 1938 Act, 
“nothing in the Act indicated that a regulation issued under the authority of 
section 701(a) would subject the violator to any sanction.”68  The differences 
between sections 701(a) and 701(e) reinforced this conclusion.  Section 701(a) 
did not then and does not now establish any requirements for a closed record of 
evidence and a trial-type hearing.69  It would have been incongruous if the 
FDA had needed to follow elaborate evidence and hearing requirements for 
about half a dozen rulemakings, but no similar requirements for rulemakings 
on much more important issues in its food and drug dockets.  In other words, 
the FDA’s narrow rulemaking powers confirmed what was apparent from the 
rest of the 1938 Act.  Except where 701(e) gave the FDA rulemaking powers 
to the contrary, the FDA was primarily an enforcement agency for its food and 
cosmetics dockets, and primarily a licensing agency for its drug docket. 
Congress confirmed this understanding of section 701(a) over the years by 
amending the Act to insert sections granting the FDA more legislative-
rulemaking powers over targeted subjects.  For instance, in the 1976 Medical 
Device Amendments, in what is now section 513 of the Act, Congress vested 
in the FDA power to classify medical devices into one of the three statutory 
 
 65. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1055 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 371 (2000)). 
 66. Id.  For the most famous judicial discussion of “formal” rulemaking, see United States v. 
Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 238–45 (1973). 
 67. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. at 1055. 
 68. Merrill & Watts, supra note 63, at 515. 
 69. See 21 U.S.C. § 371. 
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categories.70  Amended section 514 of the Act vested in the FDA power to set 
performance standards for medical devices.71  Amended section 515 vested in 
the FDA power to promulgate regulations for medical device manufacturers to 
follow in order to gain approval of Class III medical devices, the most 
dangerous and closely regulated class of medical devices.72  Amended section 
516 vested in the FDA power to promulgate regulations banning devices it 
proved to be substantially deceptive or unreasonably dangerous.73  All of these 
enabling statutes contemplate that the FDA will promulgate legislative rules 
with the force of law and subject to FDA enforcement for their violation.74 
Consistent with trends throughout administrative law in the 1960s and 1970s, 
all of these rulemaking statutes made it easier than section 701(e) for the FDA 
to make legislative rules.  None required the FDA to provide a formal, trial-
type hearing on a closed record; all allowed the FDA to proceed by informal, 
“notice and comment” rulemaking requirements consistent with section 553 of 
the Administrative Procedure Act.75  Congress thus “ratified” the narrow 
understanding of section 701(a): If Section 701(a) authorized the FDA to 
promulgate legislative rules with informal notice-and-comment procedures, all 
of these medical-device rulemaking powers would have been unnecessary.76 
At roughly the same time as Congress was giving the FDA new statutory 
rulemaking powers, however, the FDA made what one treatise called a 
“belated discovery” that section 701(a) of the Act had given the FDA 
 
 70. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(d). 
 71. See 21 U.S.C. § 360d(b). 
 72. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b). 
 73. See 21 U.S.C. § 360f(a). 
 74. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(f), (g) (2000) (defining medical devices as adulterated if they 
violate specified regulations); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(b), (c) (making it a federal offense to sell 
or receive an adulterated medical device in interstate commerce, or to adulterate a device while it 
is in interstate commerce). 
 75. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 
F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  Section 516 gives the FDA power to make medical-device bans 
effective immediately upon publication as long as it provides notice and opportunity for comment 
as expeditiously as possible.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360f(b).  This provision is not necessarily 
inconsistent with section 553 of the APA, however, because section 553 allows agencies to 
suspend notice-and-comment procedures when they have good cause.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B); 
see also Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 969 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 
1992). 
 76. For a recent illustration of this “ratification” principle at work in statutory interpretation, 
see FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (holding that the FDA was 
barred from treating nicotine as a “drug” and cigarettes as “combination” drug-device products, 
both within the jurisdiction of the Act, because Congress had “ratified” the FDA’s position that 
these articles were not within FDA jurisdiction by passing several statutes regulating nicotine and 
cigarettes inconsistently with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). 
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legislative-rulemaking powers all along.77  Peter Barton Hutt served as the 
FDA’s chief counsel from 1971 to 1975.78  During his tenure, he advocated 
reading the Act as a “constitution.”79  He read section 701(a) to provide “ample 
legal authority” for the FDA to issue legislative rules.80 
As a legal argument, Hutt’s reading of section 701(a) may have run 
contrary to long-standing practice, but it was quite plausible in the context of 
the 1970s.  Read in isolation, section 701(a) seems to confer a generous grant 
of rulemaking power.  Again, it gives the FDA power to “promulgate 
regulations for the efficient enforcement” of the Act.81  To read section 701(a) 
narrowly, one must remember to read it in pari materia with the more 
cumbersome formal-rulemaking provisions set forth in section 701(e), and in 
the context of 1938, when administrative enabling statutes tended to be much 
more grudging in their grants of general rulemaking authority.  In the context 
of the “rights revolution” around 1975, however, these background 
assumptions for reading enabling language no longer made any sense.  Little 
wonder, then, if the Second Circuit validated the FDA’s exercise of legislative-
rulemaking powers in two decisions in 1978 and 1981.82  In the 1981 case, 
administrative-law expert Judge Henry Friendly read section 701(a) “with the 
eyes of 1980” and concluded it gave the FDA power to promulgate both 
“substantive as well as procedural” regulations.83 
Hutt’s entrepreneurship and the Second Circuit’s statutory construction 
gave the FDA the power to make legislative rules on a par with the EPA, 
OSHA, and other agencies created during the Great Society and the Nixon 
years. The shift should not be overstated.  To a degree unusual for most 
agencies, the FDA still sets policy by generating guidelines and interpretive 
rules.  The FDA has considerable freedom to generate “shadow law.”  This 
freedom is especially wide in drug regulation because the new drug approval 
 
 77. 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 4.02, at 4-10 (1979).  
Compare Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973), with 
Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970) (indicating that section 
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 79. Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and 
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 80. Id. at 185.  See also Merrill & Watts, supra note 63, at 558–60. 
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Watts, supra note 63, at 562–65. 
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process and the economic pressures to rush new drugs to market make it 
suicidal for manufacturers to challenge the FDA’s constructions of its 
statutes.84  Even so, as one leading treatise observed at the time, “[t]he Food 
and Drug Administration grew during the late 1960s and the 1970s from a law 
enforcement agency which brought deterrent actions against violators, into a 
more paper-bound generator of rules and regulations.”85 
E. Changes in the Courts: The Rise of Purposivism 
As the Second Circuit’s active participation in expanding the FDA’s 
rulemaking powers shows, courts were not passive bystanders in the expansion 
of administrative power during the 1960s and 1970s.  Courts changed 
generally applicable canons of construction to accommodate the rise of the 
Great Society regulatory agency.  For instance, one 1956 case construed the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act not to allow the FDA to seek restitution relief, 
in large part because “[t]he use of the extraordinary remedies of equity in 
governmental litigation should never be permitted by the courts unless clearly 
authorized by the statute in express terms.”86  After several decades of 
Supreme Court precedent attacking this presumption, a 1999 appellate court 
could confidently reverse the presumption: “Absent a clear command by 
Congress that a statute providing for equitable relief excludes certain forms of 
such relief, this court will presume the full scope of equitable powers may be 
exercised.”87 
The most important contribution by courts related to how they construed 
agency organic statutes.  The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the rise of a style of 
public-law statutory interpretation known as “purposivism.” 
The U.S. Supreme Court encouraged the use of purposivism in several 
FDA cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  In United States v. An Article of 
Drug Bacto-Unidisk, for instance, the Supreme Court considered a challenge 
by the maker of a bacteria sensitivity disk to the FDA’s decision to classify the 
disk as a “drug” and not as a (pre-1976 Amendment) “device.”88  The disk 
maker’s argument was probably weak in any event, because the Act’s 
definition of “drug” is quite broad.  Even on the most “plain-meaning” reading 
of “drug,” a diagnostic bacteria sensitivity disk counts as an “article[] intended 
for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in 
 
 84. See NOAH & NOAH, supra note 60, at 104–05; Lars Noah, The FDA’s New Policy on 
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man.”89  The Supreme Court noted this plain-meaning argument but went on to 
add that “we must give effect to congressional intent in view of the well-
accepted principle that remedial legislation such as the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act is to be given a liberal construction consistent with the Act’s 
overriding purpose to protect the public health.”90 
Similarly, in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, the Court 
considered the legality of the FDA’s decision to classify generic drugs as “new 
drugs,” bound by the same pre-approval and withdrawal rules as drugs 
manufactured by mainline pharmaceutical companies.91  Because this issue 
arose before Congress passed a comprehensive set of rules for generic drugs in 
the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Amendments, it had great practical importance.92  
The Court upheld the FDA’s interpretations of the relevant statutes.  It rejected 
the argument that the generic drug manufacturers were entitled to individual 
adjudicative hearings before the FDA suspended their rights to sell their drugs.  
“To require separate judicial proceedings to be brought against each, as if each 
were the owner of a Black Acre being condemned, would be to create delay 
where in the interests of public health there should be prompt action.”93  On 
that basis, the Court “interpret[ed] separate provisions of a single Act . . . to 
give the Act ‘the most harmonious, comprehensive meaning possible’ in light 
of the legislative policy and purpose.”94 
Purposivism gave the FDA an argument for reading the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act more expansively at the margins of its jurisdiction and its 
powers.  One must be careful not to attribute too much importance to 
purposivism, because the definitional statutes of the FDCA and many of the 
FDA’s powers over adulteration and misbranding are quite broad even on a 
fairly narrow reading.  Even so, purposivism encouraged the FDA to approach 
its jurisdiction differently.  As the Act is written, jurisdictional issues are 
separate from safety issues.  If the FDA means to regulate a substance as a 
drug, it must prove first that the article is intended to have a therapeutic effect 
or to affect the structure or any function of the body.95  Only when the product 
is a drug may the FDA apply the safety standards written into section 505(d) 
and other adulteration and misbranding rules in the Act’s drug provisions.  
Purposivism encouraged the FDA to use evidence of safety problems to 
establish that articles were drugs in the first place.  If the overriding purpose of 
the Act is to protect the safety of the American public, the FDA reasoned, in 
close definitional cases better to err on the side of reading the Act to treat 
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 92. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000). 
 93. Hynson, Westcott, & Dunning, 412 U.S. at 625. 
 94. Id. at 631–32. 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 123 
particular articles as “drugs” to gain the safety benefits provided by drug 
regulations.  For instance, in an (unsuccessful) attempt to classify high dosages 
of vitamins A and D as drugs, the FDA Commissioner relied on the “potential 
for toxicity for the ingestion of large doses of these vitamins” as a ground for 
satisfying the definition of a drug.96 
IV.  THE RELATION BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE AND FDA 
MISSION 
A. The Influence of the Rights Revolution Model on the FDA 
A few lessons emerge from these developments.  First, general attitudes 
about regulation were one of several factors influencing how Congress, the 
FDA, and the courts all changed the FDA’s legal mandate.  These attitudes 
probably influenced the drafting of the Delaney Clauses, the FDA’s powers 
over food and color additives, and its new powers over drugs.  Justice Jackson 
anticipated the preference for low-tolerance safety standards in a 1953 dissent, 
when he claimed that in a world dominated not by “natural or simple products 
but [by] complex ones whose composition and qualities are often secret. . . . a 
dependent society must exact greater care than in more simple days and must 
require from manufacturers or producers increased integrity and caution as the 
only protection of its safety and well-being.”97 
To be sure, elite attitudes about safety regulation were not the only factors.  
These attitudes went hand in hand with or capitalized on popular fears, arising 
from generalized fears, like the public’s growing concern about cancer after 
World War II, and public reactions against tragedies such as those involving 
thalidomide, the Dalkon shield, and breast implants.  The Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976 show that practical concerns and interest-group politics 
could counteract elite and popular demands for lower-tolerance safety 
regulation.  Even so, elite opinions about safety regulation were one part of the 
mix. 
General elite despondency about New Deal-style regulation played a 
powerful role when the FDA made the move to expand its rulemaking powers.  
One can see the influence in a speech published by Peter Barton Hutt, then 
Assistant General Counsel for Food and Drugs, in 1973.  Hutt agreed with 
Justice Jackson in that “[t]he extraordinary variety and complexity of products 
available in the marketplace today” created a demand for more sweeping 
public-law regulation and in fact created a stronger need than when Jackson 
spoke in 1954.98  He concluded that the FDA needed to exercise “initiative and 
leadership in the public interest,” and was “obligated to develop whatever 
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innovative and creative regulatory programs are reasonable and are most 
appropriate to achieve the fundamental objectives laid down by Congress.”99 
Most important, in defending the FDA’s stance on rulemaking, Hutt 
appealed to the same sentiments that had led observers such as James Landis to 
call for more forward-looking rule- and policy-making more than a decade 
earlier: 
  In the past 20 years there has been a gradual realization both that the 
government has a duty to inform those it regulates of the precise requirements 
that they are expected to fulfill under the law, and that promulgation of 
regulations specifying in detail these legal requirements is the most effective 
and efficient means by which industry-wide regulation can be achieved.  
Standing alone, institution of legal enforcement action, resulting in costly and 
time-consuming litigation on a case-by-case basis, is an inadequate method of 
regulation.  It fails to inform the regulated industry of its obligations, it 
involves years of delay, and the end results are often uncertain.  Worst of all, it 
inevitably results in invidious selective enforcement, whereby one or two 
individuals or companies must be singled out as the test cases while the rest of 
the industry is left alone.  By contrast, the promulgation of regulations informs 
an entire industry of all applicable requirements and has proved to be far more 
likely to induce widespread compliance.100 
Here, Hutt displays Landis’s same optimism about rulemaking and pessimism 
about law-enforcement policing and administrative adjudication.  Hutt says 
nothing in this passage that is particular to the experience of the FDA; to the 
contrary, he is appealing to food and drug lawyers to let the FDA learn from 
the experiences from other agencies to discharge its responsibilities better. 
If the FDA is a reliable guide to the rest of the health law field, one of the 
reasons that many health-related agencies follow the Great Society model is 
that “everyone else was doing it.”  In the period from 1960 to 1980, members 
of Congress, their staff, leading government lawyers, and courts heavily 
involved in administrative law tended to agree that law-enforcement policing 
and administrative adjudication did not let government make policy well 
enough or fast enough to meet its obligations.  This is not to say that other 
factors, like democratic pressures, interest-group politics, and practical 
considerations, did not play a role.  Rather, in the climate of the 1960s, when 
policy-makers saw a health problem, their first response was to call for a Great 
Society-style agency and then adjust that blueprint as necessary to account for 
the political and policy problems that made the problem distinctive. 
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B. Expertise 
Separately, in my judgment, the FDA’s structure and track record tend to 
call into question another explanation typically given to explain why health 
agencies are structured the way they are.  That justification is expertise.  
Expertise proves too little as a theory for running a government.  Whatever 
value expertise brings to regulation, it does not require any single agency 
mission or organizing structure.  To illustrate with an extreme case, it would be 
possible to fold expert officials into a very strict understanding of separation of 
powers. For any complicated topic of regulation, one could deputize a group of 
experts as staff to the House and Senate authorizing committees and then 
create a separate division of the Department of Justice, like its environmental 
or antitrust divisions, staffed with experienced prosecutors and non-lawyer 
support specialists to prosecute public-law violations of the rules those 
committees persuade Congress to pass.  One then could create a separate set of 
specialized Article III courts, like the Court of Claims or the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, aided by expert special masters, to hear cases arising 
out of those specialized prosecutions.101 
Indeed, the FDA’s organization illustrates some of the different 
possibilities.  The FDA certainly has substantial expertise in the safety of food, 
devices, and drugs, but the FDA’s experts make and enforce the law differently 
in different subject areas.  All of the FDA’s centers engage in some rulemaking 
and issue guidelines and other advisory materials.  The Center for Food Safety 
and Applied Nutrition, however, devotes a considerable amount of effort to 
“traditional” executive investigatory and enforcement work—conducting 
inspections and assisting U.S. Attorneys and Department of Justice staff when 
they prosecute violations of the food adulteration and misbranding laws.102  
Meanwhile, on the drug side, the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
tends to concentrate on “adjudicative” work—reviewing new drug 
applications.  Both approaches take advantage of subject-matter expertise, but 
each does so within a different organizational chart. 
 
 101. The only limitation in a really strict system of separation of powers might be that the 
Seventh Amendment would force juries to consider factual issues that a policy-maker might 
prefer be left to expert finders of fact.  Even so, many issues of “fact” in technical proceedings are 
actually settled by legislative policy judgments. 
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C. The Relation between Great Society Positive Rights and the Need for 
Control 
Finally, the FDA’s story hints at one last explanation, the relation of 
administrative powers and structure to substantive priorities.  Even after the 
FDA started issuing legislative rules under section 701(a), it still remained in 
many respects an enforcement and licensing agency.  The FDA can remain an 
enforcement and licensing agency because its goals are relatively focused and 
only in a few cases do those goals set extremely low tolerances for safety 
problems.  While I cannot demonstrate as much here, I suspect these factors 
distinguish the FDA from federal health agencies created after 1960. 
Cass Sunstein’s account of the “rights revolution” approach to regulation, 
recounted in part I, is instructive because Sunstein appreciates how substantive 
objectives influence the coercive apparatus the law needs to achieve the 
substantive goals.  Richard Epstein appreciates this point too.  Whether or not 
one agrees with his prescriptions for health law, he has an advantage in that he 
sees the conventional wisdom among health lawyers as an outsider looking in.  
In his view, “[t]he protagonists of the [health] debate all start from one grand 
working assumption . . . that health care is a ‘right’ that should be made 
available to all Americans.”103  In Epstein’s distinction, in health law 
generally, health policy-makers generally prefer a positive, or “rights to” 
understanding of legal rights, associated with the welfare state, as opposed to a 
negative, “freedom from” conception of rights, associated with the common-
law tradition.104  Now, one can disagree with Epstein about which of the two 
conceptions of rights is preferable in health law.105 Even so, I think the FDA 
experience, especially with drug and device regulation, confirms Epstein’s 
point at a descriptive level: The choice of government structure is heavily 
influenced by a positive, entitlement conception of the right the federal 
government has committed to providing. 
Let me illustrate by using the FDA as a contrast against the rest of health 
regulation.  The following impression is just an impression because I know 
more about (and am probably more sympathetic to) the aims and practicability 
of food and drug law than the law and regulation for other federal areas of 
health law.  With those reservations, the FDA has a reputation as an agency 
that “works” better than many.  Several factors have contributed to this 
reputation.  It has a stable culture because it is a long-established agency and it 
has broad political support.  Even if the FDA suffers the occasional fiasco like 
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its attempt to regulate tobacco,106 and even if political forces occasionally 
pressure the FDA to help make drug prices more affordable, by and large, the 
FDA is apolitical, and it does not get pulled very often into high-profile 
political regulatory disputes. 
But the FDA also seems to indicate indirectly why command-and-control 
regulation might be necessary in health law.  The move to Great Society, 
“rights revolution”-style lawmaking was prompted in large part by a collective 
belief among legislators, regulators, and lawyers around 1960 that earlier 
models for regulation were not making the right kinds of regulations as fast as 
they needed to be made.  By some combination of luck and good design, the 
FDA’s overall structure illustrates when the regulatory models that preceded 
the “rights revolution” model are most likely to succeed.  Because a great deal 
of health-care regulation operates outside of the FDA’s political and 
administrative parameters, perhaps that regulation depends more heavily on the 
command-and-control model than FDA law does. 
Among the various parts of the FDA’s docket, the FDA seems to follow 
the regulatory equivalent of the “police patrol” and “fire alarm” models, each 
when appropriate.107  The FDA’s food docket shows the advantages of the pre-
New Deal, enforcement-based regulatory model.  The FDA conducts food 
inspections and initiates prosecutions and seizure proceedings.  It issues 
legislative food identity and labeling standards, but it relies heavily on industry 
compliance with those standards.  With respect to food, the FDA relies heavily 
on the fire-alarm model, “less centralized and involv[ing] less active . . . 
oversight.”108  Now, because this approach relies heavily on industry 
compliance and after-the-fact discovery and prosecution, relatively speaking it 
does not allow the FDA to change food manufacturers’ incentives or set 
exacting standards.  On the other hand, the FDA probably has no other choice.  
FDA lawyers and officials are fond of saying that consumers spend twenty-five 
cents of every dollar on products within the FDA’s jurisdiction; of those 
twenty-five cents, consumers spend nineteen on foods.109  Practically, it is 
extremely unlikely that the FDA would ever try to guarantee the safety of food 
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before the fact, and it would be extremely difficult for the FDA to regulate 
food on any standard higher than its potential to cause illness or injury. 
With respect to devices, the FDA takes something of an intermediate 
position between the pre-New Deal enforcement model and the New Deal 
licensing model.  The medical-device provisions of the Act give the FDA 
power to conduct drug-like pre-approval over Class III drugs, the most 
dangerous class of devices.  But again, in part because the device market is 
more diffuse, the FDA allows most devices to go to market without pre-market 
approval, only with pre-market notification, on the ground that they are 
substantially equivalent to devices grandfathered or already approved.  And the 
substantive standard is a less stringent standard: The FDA need only be 
satisfied with a reasonable assurance of safety and efficacy for the devices’ 
intended use. 
At the other extreme, when it comes to drugs, the FDA approaches most 
closely to the New Deal licensing, a police-patrol model—“comparatively 
centralized, active, and direct.”110  Here, the FDA is required to approve the 
manufacturer’s showing that an applied-for drug is safe and effective 
according to clinical methodology considered adequate for the field.  This is an 
ambitious responsibility.  To the extent the FDA manages to discharge it in a 
timely manner,111 one of the factors is that it does not need to consider many 
applications.  In 2002, the FDA received eighty-seven new new-drug 
applications, granted seventy-eight pending new-drug applications, and granted 
321 generic applications.112  Pharmaceutical research and development are 
prohibitively expensive (in no small part because of the NDA process itself).  
Thus, the FDA can afford to be what Richard Merrill called a sort of 
“warrantor of manufacturer compliance with the rules that govern drug 
development and marketing,” because it needs to consider relatively few new 
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drug applications.113  It can demand that drug manufacturers follow a 
centralized ex ante licensing system at least in part because it is not besieged 
by drug applications. 
The FDA stands in contrast with much health-care regulation because it 
can indulge in the enforcement and licensing models where other health 
agencies cannot.  The FDA’s overriding mission relates to the quality of the 
products it regulates—that they be safe, effective, and not misleading or 
deceptive.  By contrast, other federal health agencies are required to discharge 
broader and conflicting sets of goals—involving issues such as access to health 
care, at adequate quality, and for affordable prices.  Furthermore, in those areas 
where the FDA is required to take the most centralized, ex ante, labor-intensive 
approach, relatively speaking, the FDA does not have many items on its 
agenda.  By contrast, I suspect that health-care finance and access issues create 
many problems.  Thus, the structures chosen in regulatory health law may be a 
product of the statutory goals health agencies are required to meet, the hard 
policy choices they must make between conflicting goals, and the broad 
interests they must control or accommodate in pursuing those goals. 
Thus, the FDA can afford to monitor food primarily by enforcement 
because it is only regulating food for one main criterion—safety.  And it can 
centralize drug and to a lesser extent device regulation because it again has a 
discrete regulatory objective and because there are not many applications to 
consider.  To the extent that these conditions break down in health-care 
regulation, there is a much greater need for sweeping rulemaking and stronger 
enforcement powers to meet the various goals of health care. 
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